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A rum deal: the purser’s measure and accounting control of 
materials in the Royal Navy, 1665-1832 
 
We draw on archival resources and maritime and accounting history literature to 
explore the role of Royal Navy pursers between 1665 and 1832. Through an agency 
theory lens, we investigate accounting-related practices pursers used to control 
consumable rations, including the ‘Purser’s [short] measure.’ The records pursers 
were required to keep suggest that the Royal Navy was at the forefront of the 
development of cost and materials accounting, and in the keeping of detailed 
accounting records. We provide fresh insights to the purser’s role and his association 
with the gestation of materials waste controls, standard costing, and audit and 
accountability processes.  
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Introduction 
Assessments of the character and capabilities of persons engaged as Royal Navy [RN] 
pursers before 1832 vary considerably. He [there were no female pursers] was an essential 
crew member with many distinctive, stereotypical personality characteristics. These include 
entrepreneurial cunning and a capacity to be inured to the frequent scorn directed at him. The 
purser is claimed to have been the ‘most denounced, satirized and lampooned of all the 
officers in the King’s ships’; an ‘alchemist’ who could transform rotten and mouldy food into 
something quite edible1 and ‘a dexterous cheat.’2 Pursers on ‘ships of the line’ (warships) 
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have been assessed more generously: for example, to have been ‘universally accepted as a 
Gentleman and suitable Company for even the Commander himself.’3  
In this paper we develop a broader understanding of accounting-related aspects of the 
role of RN pursers, and of the accounting controls that were part of the performance of their 
everyday duties. We use agency theory to analyse the purser’s role and how it evolved 
between 1665 and 1832. Our analysis period commences in 1665 because this is when 
Samuel Pepys (Clerk of the Acts) proposed the appointment of a central ‘Surveyor General of 
Victualling for HM Navy.’4 It ends in 1832 because this was the date of the abolition of the 
RN Victualling Board [hereafter, the Board]. We bring together hitherto scattered, inchoate 
and sometimes incidental literature that has addressed accounting and accountability practices 
adopted by RN pursers. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no previous analysis, 
using agency theory, of the relationship between the Board and RN pursers.  
The Admiralty created the Board in 1683 to replace a victualling system based on private 
contracts with one that gave it greater direct control. Thereby, there was thought to be 
enhanced prospect of improving efficiency and quality control.5 The Board supplied food, 
drink and other provisions for naval ships, mostly through its victualling yards in RN 
dockyards, to individual pursers. The Board was the second subordinate board established by 
the Admiralty − the Navy Board (responsible for dockyards, naval stores, shipbuilding and 
repairs) had been established in the sixteenth century.6 The Board was one of the largest 
enterprises in Britain, and it had operations throughout the world.  
In 1801 the Board was ‘responsible for feeding 400,000 sailors, soldiers and 
miscellaneous personnel spread across the world, and was required to do so cheaply, 
efficiently and honestly.’7 At the height of the Napoleonic Wars, expenditure by the Board 
represented one eighth of all government spending.8 The Board’s success in ‘deliver[ing] 
commercial effectiveness and efficiency’9 to the RN is partly attributable to its exploitation of 
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agency arrangements involving pursers. Such agency arrangements helped to dilute rigid 
hierarchical organizational structures in the RN, and allowed the Board to improve 
administrative effectiveness and resource usage.10 
We review primary and secondary literature relating to RN pursers, together with related 
aspects of accounting in the RN between 1665 and 1832. The literature we draw upon was 
identified using keyword searches on Google Scholar and catalogue searches at the RN 
Dockyard library, Portsmouth, UK. We highlight the broader historical context of the RN’s 
development of accounting practices for materials wastage, standard costing, and inventory 
control. The ‘purser’s measure’ (the practice of only issuing sailors seven eighths of the 
rations supplied by the Board)11 was implicated in nascent forms of standard costing and 
accounting control of materials waste before the onset of the British Industrial Revolution 
[hereafter, simply the Industrial Revolution]  ─ commonly dated from about 1760.12 
In the next section, we outline our analytical framework, in two parts. First, to help form 
conclusions about the significance of the accounting control practices of pursers, we briefly 
overview literature pertaining to the history of accounting for materials, especially in Britain. 
In the second (and more substantive part), we outline relevant elements of agency theory. 
Throughout this paper, we draw upon agency theory to explain the role and purpose of 
pursers, and the relationship between pursers and the Board. We discuss the purser’s 
appointment and duties, his financial emoluments and incentives, and the accounts he was 
required to keep. We also introduce discussion of the naval mutinies at Spithead and Nore in 
1797 which resulted in abolition of the pursers’ measure. We elaborate on pursers’ 
incentives, the instrumental role of the ‘purser’s pound’ in control of stores and provisions, 
and the accounting procedures to which pursers were subject. We draw on agency theory to 
explain the actions of pursers and the Board. We then draw conclusions and offer suggestions 
for further research.  
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Analytical framework 
Accounting control for materials: An overview 
Accounting-related controls of materials, and for materials waste, were used in Latin 
European countries from the turn of the sixteenth century: for example, allowances for raw 
materials waste were used at the Venice Arsenal.13 Similar accounting techniques were used 
too at the Royal Textile Mill of Guadalajara (1717-44) in response to problems arising from 
poor quality raw materials. This prompted that mill’s senior management to introduce 
controls through ‘pre­established standards’ to ‘control the consumption of raw material.’14 
In 1737, the Royal Textile Mill ‘enforced stricter control of materials handling ... ranging from 
storage to the avoidance of unnecessary delays in their incorporation into the production 
process, to accounting, to weighing.’15 In the Silk Factory Company of Portugal, 1745-1747, 
there was a weight allowance of approximately 6% (10 ounces) in the calculation of the 
estimated average cost of a job ‘for losses due to spoilage and shrinkage’, together with 
evidence of the ‘elements of a rudimentary standard raw material costing system’.16  
Accounting history literature suggests that accounting techniques for materials, and 
standard cost systems, arose in the UK much later. In the UK, in contrast to the European 
experience, although there was an awareness of cost accounting in a variety of records prior 
to the Industrial Revolution17, application of practical techniques for reducing waste through 
‘norm-based standard costs … [did not occur until] the late nineteenth century.’18 
During the Industrial Revolution ‘control of waste was very much a concern for 
entrepreneurs of the time, particularly in the dominant iron and textile industries.19 
Inventory control ‘was practised by a substantial majority of Industrial Revolution 
enterprises … [with inventory]… typically maintained at standard cost’.20 
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The lens of agency theory 
Agency theory is an appropriate lens through which to analyse complex contractual 
relationships. It is relevant in settings where ownership and control are separate.21 The 
flexible nature of agency theory renders it suitable for extension to diverse contexts beyond 
traditional scenarios where the fundamentals of self-interest, information asymmetry and 
agency cost control can be applied more widely.22  
An agency relationship arises where one group (principals) delegate control to another 
group (agents). Agency theory assumes that both groups are motivated by self-interest. This 
leads to an inherent conflict of interest. Agency costs arise when an agent’s goals diverge 
from those of a principal. This is particularly the case where the agent has more information 
than the principal − a condition known as ‘information asymmetry’. Agency costs involve the 
cost of measuring and evaluating the manager’s performance, the cost of compensating 
managers in a way that correlates with the owner’s interests, and the cost of devising and 
enforcing specific behavioural rules or policies. Costs are reduced when the interests of the 
two parties are congruent, or when the principal has knowledge of the agent’s actions. 
Agency theory highlights the incentive for a principal to expend resources to ensure agents 
act in the best interests of the principal. Such incentive creates the need for governance 
mechanisms. 
We draw from each of three streams of agency theory.23 From the ‘most popular stream’ 
we focus on ‘incentive alignment [and] compensation policies’.24 From the second stream, of 
‘corporate governance and control,’ we give particular attention to ‘bonding mechanisms’.25 
From the third stream of ‘agency problems, agency costs, efficacy and trade-offs of different 
control mechanisms,’ we focus on the ‘purser’s pound’ as a control mechanism.26 Below, we 
highlight several important elements of agency theory that we use to explain the role and 
activities of RN pursers.27  
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An important aspect of agency theory is the information asymmetry between the agent 
(for example, RN purser) and the principal (for example, the Board).28 One of the 
consequences of information asymmetry is ‘moral hazard’: where agents take advantage of 
the lack of observability of their behaviour by a principal.29 Another consequence is ‘adverse 
selection.’ This occurs where one party to an exchange has information about themselves that 
the other party cannot obtain without incurring a cost: for example a prospective agent’s 
ability to satisfy a principal’s demands. Contracts with agents (here, RN pursers) have two 
foci: a system to monitor the agent’s actions; and a reward structure to align the agents’ 
interests with those of the principal.30  
Agency theory has been criticised for being excessively narrow, and for generating few 
testable implications.31 It has been assailed for promoting an under-socialised view of 
principals and agents by assuming they are driven entirely by self-interest, regardless of 
social context.32 In applying agency theory, we should not underestimate an agent’s 
propensity to behave opportunistically, and a principal’s capacity for rationality.33  
The assumption of a dyadic relationship between individuals is likely to be an over-
simplistic description of reality.34 Actors can be principals and agents at the same time. For 
example, although the Board was a major principal in respect to pursers who acted as its 
agents in the distribution of provisions, the Board itself was an agent of the Admiralty. In 
turn, the Admiralty was an agent of the government. There was a danger that the Board 
would shirk, engage in corruption, or monitor the wrong things. Therefore the Board required 
monitoring too.  
Remoteness of relationships and unreliable systems of communication can influence the 
propensity for ultimate principals to invest in reducing agency costs. Principals are likely to 
conclude they will not feel the consequences of opportunistic or incompetent agents. Another 
complication is that an agent might have to serve two principals. For example, although a 
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purser received provisions from the Board, the captain of his vessel is another principal to be 
served. Many of the certificates and receipts submitted with accounts to the Board had to be 
counter-signed by the captain first: he was in a position to exert power over the purser. 
Additionally, because the purser’s slop accounts were examined and passed by the Navy 
Board, they had to be kept separately from victualling accounts, thus creating another 
principal-agent relationship. Despite these complications, agency theory provides an 
insightful and instructive framework for viewing the relationship between the Board and RN 
pursers.  
 
The purser’s agency  
Pursers were first assigned to ‘the King’s ships’ in the fourteenth century.35 They ‘acted as 
paymaster of the crew … had charge of [non-military] stores and provisions36 … [kept] 
account of receipts and payments for the ship and crew, and [took] charge of slops [sailors’ 
sea clothing] and provisions for issue.’37 The slops included ‘jackets, waistcoats, drawers, 
shirts, frocks, trousers, stockings, hats, shoes and blankets.’38 There was a classic 
principal/agent relationship. The purser’s duties of paying the crew and accounting for stores 
and provisions were carried out in the interests of one or both of two major absent principals, 
the Board and the Navy Board (for slops). The actions of pursers were difficult to monitor 
closely on a day-to-day basis because ships were often at sea, often away from British shores, 
or were otherwise unobservable. 
During the latter half of the seventeenth century, Pepys was a prominent promoter of the 
well-being of naval personnel and the need for efficiency in the navy. He estimated that funds 
available for the navy in 1665-66 were no more than half of probable requirements. The 
consequences of this shortfall included unpaid wages and delays in victualling the fleet.39 In 
1683, state control of the provisioning of RN ships was strengthened when vessels were 
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purchased specifically to supply RN ships at sea. This prompted Pepys, in 1686, to introduce 
an investment plan of £400,000 per annum to restore funding levels and attain logistical 
efficiency.40  
The mobilization of the fleet against William of Orange in 1688 provided an early test of 
Pepys’ new arrangements for the supply of the fleet. A late demand to provide three month’s 
provisions for an additional 35 ships put pressure on victuallers. It became apparent that the 
major issue was not merely that of purchase and supply, but of measurement and control. 
There were discrepancies in estimates between victuallers and pursers regarding the 
quantities supplied, and the quantities actually consumed. In correspondence with Lord 
Dartmouth41, Pepys remarked that ‘the service may meet with disappointment …if the 
commissioners here goe by one reckoning and the men eat by another.’42 The solution 
proposed by Pepys was a more precise standard of bookkeeping and measurement, and better 
regulated disposal of the victuals themselves. Through personal management, forethought 
and energy, Pepys’ proposals heralded a more formal state control of pursers.43 The 1730 
‘Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty’s Service at Sea’, included instruction 
on victualling.44  
 
Pursers’ appointment and duties 
A purser had to be a man of some substance and/or be well-connected. In 1813, he had to 
produce three certificates of competence and find two persons who would provide acceptable 
sureties.45 Each purser was required ‘to lodge a bond46 which was used as a lever to ensure 
that the purser, upon his return from a voyage, submitted the necessary accounts, returns and 
vouchers.’47 The amount of bond varied according to the size of the purser’s assigned ship.48 
For example, in 1807 a bond of £1200 was needed for a first rate ship and £600 for a sixth 
rate ship.49 The bond was applied for the full period during which the purser was assigned to 
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a ship. The bond requirement was reduced,50 and then removed, in 1852. If a purser was in 
debt at the end of his service, those guaranteeing the purser’s bond would be liable to pay the 
amount due upon a balancing of relevant accounts.51  
     In addition to finding a financially-endowed guarantor, the purser was required to obtain 
credit on favourable terms to begin his assigned duties.52 Thus, his moral obligation to bond 
guarantors was an inducement to align his interests (as agent) with those of the Board (as the 
most important principal). Such obligations also helped to control for adverse selection of 
pursers. 
The purser’s prime duty was to ensure his ship was provisioned adequately. The type and 
amount of provisions was fixed in standard physical allowances for the ship’s class and the 
number of months for which storage was required.53 The first victualling contract which set 
daily rations for each man was drawn up by Pepys in 1677, based on the traditional diet of 
salt meat, ‘pease’ and biscuit.54 The standard rations, which were amended in 1731 (for 
example: pork and oatmeal were included for the first time), remained fundamentally 
unchanged until 1824.  
The rationing practices adopted were a rudimentary form of direct materials standards 
allowance,55 of the type found in more sophisticated versions of standard costing that were 
implemented commonly in the mid 1800s in UK manufacturing companies. Permissible 
substitutes were also identified if a ship was abroad (for example, one gallon of beer could be 
replaced by one pint of wine; one pint of olive oil by one pound of butter).56 On long 
voyages, fresh meat usually had to be replaced by salt meat: ‘… the shelf life of fresh beef 
was extended by shipping the beasts live and slaughtering them as required.’57 However, 
most provisions were supplied through dockyards under contracts negotiated by the Board. 
The purser’s account was charged with the value of the ship’s provisions and the casks and 
bags to hold them.58  
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Pursers acted ‘as banker to the crew [and undertook to] trade in items, such as tobacco … 
and … other non-essential items such as candles and groceries … [and to keep] a strict 
control of stores … [because] he was personally liable in the event of a shortfall.’59 
Additionally, the purser issued slops and supplied crew with fixed amounts of other 
consumable stores, known as ‘necessaries’ − wood, candles, platters, cans, spoons, lanterns, 
lamp oil, and bedding, for which he had to account.60 An enterprising purser could also earn 
additional income from trading on his own initiative. He could stock and sell small items 
(such as pepper and boot polish) to the officers and men.61  
A principal/agent situation operated. The purser was acting for the Board, but the two 
parties had different interests. When the purser’s ship was at sea, the Board was unable to 
fully supervise the purser’s actions or have full knowledge of his conduct. There was 
information asymmetry, conducive to moral hazard. Many pursers were not well paid and had 
strong incentive to seek ways to use their position for personal gain. 
The purser was, in effect, a ship-board shopkeeper, banker and entrepreneur. He had 
strong personal incentives to maximize his profit on sales of goods, and to increase his 
general level of income. There may have been opportunities to forge entries in his muster 
books, issue substitute rations on terms favourable to him, and over-consume on perquisites. 
A purser would also have known that if he engaged in such behaviour, he would be acting 
contrary to the terms of his contract. 
The overriding rule for issuing provisions was to use the oldest rations first. This was an 
early form of ‘first in first out’ [FIFO] inventory flow. This practice was regulated by the 
practice of not reimbursing monies to pursers for goods unused by the required dates (unless 
a survey allowed otherwise).62 In this way, the Board aligned incentives and compensations. 
This helped it to overcome the problem of information asymmetry.  
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Pursers were often isolated. They often aroused animosity.63 Superstitious sailors who 
watched ‘the great albatrosses following their ships in southern latitudes, week after week … 
saw in them the souls of pursers long departed, haunting their former ships in a sleepless 
search for savings.’64 Although many pursers were merely small shopkeepers in terms of 
social standing,65 nonetheless, in major ships, the purser’s shipboard status was much higher. 
After about 1750, the purser would often have been part of the officer’s mess or wardroom, 
along with the ships ‘quarter deck officers’ (e.g. surgeons, lieutenants). Despite such 
standing, pursers often slept below the water line on top of the spirit room, to deter 
pilfering.66 The purser’s role evolved to align his interests (as agent) with the interests of the 
Board (as principal). Thus, by the early nineteenth century, a purser was required to have 
‘served a year as a Captain’s Clerk’; he did not ‘keep watch’; and he ‘had a steward.’67 In 
larger ships, to help the purser cope with his prescribed duties, he was assisted by a steward 
and a cooper (who were both paid from the purser’s own pocket). Payment of wages was 
added to the list of purser’s responsibilities in 1825 and his job title was extended to 
‘Paymaster and Purser’.  
 
Financial emoluments and incentives 
Before 1794, it has been claimed that the purser ‘was allowed no salary beyond that which he 
could realise in saving, or … [by] pilfering the seaman’s rations’.68 The accuracy of this 
claim is dubious in view of competing claims that, in 1686, a purser on a first rate vessel 
received a salary of £1 and 4 shillings per month.69 What is more settled regarding the pay 
levels of pursers is the proposition that the purser’s remuneration came ‘much more from 
profits on [his shipboard] store transactions than from his own wages.’70 A leading authority 
has observed that ‘A purser’s real chance of wealth lay not in his official duties but in private 
business, in broking, money lending and agency ... as the rewards of pursery itself were 
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slender and precarious.’71 In 1665, Pepys wrote that ‘a purser without professed cheating is a 
professed loser.’72 A similar view, expressed in the latter half of the seventeenth century was 
that ‘the recognised way that the ship’s Purser was paid … was by the ‘savings’ he could 
make on cheating the sailors of their rations and slops.’73 
In return for providing his ship with coals, wood, tunnery-ware, candles and lanthorns 
[lanterns], the purser received allowances of 14 pence per man per month while at sea;74 4 
pence per tun for ‘drawage of beer’; 2 shillings per month for loading charges;75 and an 
allowance for wasted storage containers (i.e. casks, iron hoops, bags and jars). If the Board 
accepted a purser’s annual accounts, a bonus related to the size of the vessel was payable: in 
1807 it was £25 for a ship with a complement of 800 men. The purser received additional 
payments if his ship flew a flag or broad pennant, was on convoy duty, or carried top or poop 
lights.76 He received a commission of up to 10% on sales of tobacco (and soap from 1825), 
based on the price charged to seamen. For his care and effort in issuing slop clothes and 
bedding and managing related accounts, the purser received a commission of one shilling in 
the pound (that is, 5%) on the revenue generated from sales. Because there was no alternative 
supply of slops on board, the purser had the opportunity to cheat on price and quality.77 A 
further commission (also at one shilling in the pound) was payable on the value of dead 
men’s clothes and other effects sold to crew members.78 Pursers were also able to earn a 
profit from their entrepreneurial activities − although the extent of this would depend on their 
abilities and the size of the ship. 
Pursers were also entitled to share in monetary rewards paid to crews for capturing or 
sinking an enemy ship. During this period (16th to 18th century) those who worked in 
maritime jobs were important to the economy and to society: they made a significant 
contribution to economic growth.79 Seamen could move relatively easily between civil and 
military ships. Naval pay did not increase from 1652 to 1797.80 Merchant navy wages were 
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higher, especially in wartime when labour shortages drove wages up. Naval crews were 
allowed to share in ‘prize money,’81although often this did not compensate for the difference, 
except in cases where prizes of exceptional value were taken.82 The Admiralty established a 
Prize Court to evaluate claims and determine the division of money. During the Napoleonic 
Wars (1803-1815), it was customary to pass on part of the value of prizes to the crew. The 
wardroom Warrant Officers (including the purser) generally secured one eighth of the total 
value.83 The sums allocated could be considerable. For example, purser Thomas Peckston was 
allocated prize money of £85/2s./4d. from the capture of La Vierge du Bon Conseil on 29 
November 1812.84  
Ships’ provisions were issued by a [short] weight known as the ‘purser’s pound.’85 This 
was ‘an abuse sanctioned by custom.’86 The purser’s pound compensated the purser for the 
loss of weight of stores that arose, under his stewardship, due to spoilage, evaporation or 
shrinkage: 
… the purser was required to issue to the men only seven eighths of that with which he had been supplied 
by Government. … If all or any part of the other eighth remained when the annual survey was taken upon 
the stores in the purser’s care, he took it on charge as a new supply, and was allowed a fixed price for it by 
the Government.87 
In 1761, a popular manual for seamen provides the following advice to pursers regarding 
the purser’s measure: 
All you deliver by Weight or Measure you are to keep 1/8 part for waste; the Measure of 7 Pints is for a 
Gallon of Beer; you receive 16 ounces and issue 14 ounces of butter and cheese, you receive Winchester 
measure88, and issue Wine Measure; as one Wine Pint of Pease to a Piece of Pork; a Wine Gallon of 
Oatmeal for a sized fish.89  
The ‘purser’s pound’ was used until 1797. It provided a general allowance for loss and 
wastage of materials90 andwas a useful means for the purser to ensure he was not indebted 
and earned a good living. Thus, the purser was permitted to issue dry provisions using a 14 
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ounce pound; and to issue liquids by a purser’s quart of 35 fluid ounces. These measures 
were ‘short’ by 12.5% — or almost exactly the 12% wastage officially permitted.91 There 
was also a separate waste allowance for casks.92 A former purser, Pyend, reported in 1674 
that because the allowed money for ‘necessaries’ was insufficient to defray relevant costs,93 it 
was customary to leave one-eighth of the victuals on shore and to receive the value from the 
victualler before sailing.94 
 By condoning the use of short measures and allowing pursers to claim any unissued 
stores and provisions, the Board endowed pursers with strong financial incentive to closely 
control the way they stored and issued rations and provisions. The ‘purser’s [short] measure’, 
gave pursers (as agents) a legitimated device to help them act in congruence with the Board’s 
objective of ensuring adequate provisioning of ships at any time. Pursers knew that if they 
stored provisions well, and issued them according to regulations established by their principal 
(the Board), they could acquire property rights to one-eighth of such materials, and some 
were also suspected of selling those provisions preserved or saved.95 
 An opportunity for corruption and over consumption of perquisites by pursers was 
presented by the manner in which they maintained the ship’s muster book − the base 
recording document for issuing rations to seamen. The muster book contained details of when 
and where each man joined the ship; whether ‘press ganged’ to join or a volunteer; details of 
death, discharge or any other absence ashore; and details of other items issued, such as 
tobacco or slops. Short allowances were entered in the book, as well as times of ‘petty 
warrant’ (when the ship was in port and rations were approximately 2/3 of those allowed at 
sea, with fresh provisions replacing the preserved ones required for long voyages).96 
 Creative practices included ‘pursers entering men in the sea-books some days before 
they were aboard the ship, and also not discharging them until some days after they had gone 
from the ship.’97 This enabled pursers to claim extra wages and rations for an extended 
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period. Delaying the record of a man’s death or discharge provided the opportunity to forge a 
‘ticket’ to claim his wages.98 However, the purser could not act alone in perpetrating such 
acts: the muster book had to be signed every second month by him,99 and by the captain, the 
master100 and the boatswain.101Such corrupt and profiteering practices would have been more 
likely while a ship was at sea. When in port, mustering (‘monitoring’ in agency theory terms) 
was conducted closely by the local ‘Clerk of the Cheque.’102 He was an officer who kept ‘the 
muster-rolls of a dockyard and musters of the ship’s companies of vessels in the port to check 
false entries.’103 Nonetheless, some peculiar practices were condoned. For example, from 
1763 until 1831, ‘a purser was entitled to keep two imaginary men per hundred on his books 
[for his own benefit], and these were known as Widow’s men.’104 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the incentive to engage in corrupt and profiteering 
practices was diminished: the purser was employed by the Navy Board and was paid a salary 
‘equivalent to that of the boatswain, the gunner and the carpenter and his responsibility was 
not markedly greater than theirs if it was greater at all.’105 Opportunities for defrauding the 
naval administration became rarer as accounting mechanisms became more robust and the 
Board became increasingly effective in reducing the need to buy provisions directly. Many 
pursers found to have committed fraud were dealt with severely.106 Furthermore, the 
assumption that the portions of rations withheld from seamen could be turned into additional 
money for the purser is debatable too: the quality of stored provisions was usually poor so it 
would be hard to imagine anybody buying them.107 Nonetheless, the purser’s right to retain 
one eighth of provisions gave him a strong incentive to minimise waste and spoilage of his 
ship’s provisions. Similarly, the State’s practice of bearing only about half of the cost of 
‘necessaries’ the purser was required to provide108 was a control measure directed to ‘abate’ 
the ‘seamen’s extravagance in wood and candles’ (and presumably other necessaries).109  
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Spithead mutiny 
In 1797, a mutiny by RN sailors at Spithead (near Portsmouth), and subsequently at Nore (in 
the Thames Estuary), aroused fears of a wider uprising against the ruling classes — as had 
occurred in the [then recent] revolution in France.110 Although no violent insurrection took 
place, the sailors’ extreme strength of feeling was evident. Their major grievances related to 
the inadequacy of their pay and the poor conditions under which they served (such as shore 
leave arrangements, treatment of sailors wounded in action, arbitrary punishments).111 The 
Spithead mutineers referred to the fact that ‘their provisions were supplied by the purser’s 
pound, and not by an honest pound.’112 They requested that provisions be allocated at a 
weight of sixteen ounces to the pound, and that all measures be the same as those used for 
commercial trade. They demanded that food rations be of better quality.113 
The Spithead mutiny led to the abolition of the purser’s pound114 and to other 
improvements in the conditions and pay of seamen.115 Salaries were raised for all seamen, 
including pursers. Payment to pursers for short allowances could only be made in the 
presence of the captain and master, signed by the recipient and a warrant officer. The 
accounting requirements for a purser became more extensive and prescriptive.116 They 
specified various actions to be taken by pursers to control any conflict of objectives. These 
included the provision of quarterly statements signed by the captain, and extensive use of 
signed certificates indicating compliance with regulations. 
Gradually, further improvements were made in RN rationing. Fruit juice was introduced 
in 1795 (and lemon juice in 1799) to prevent scurvy − although even as late as 1825 it was 
still not general issue.117 By 1815, water was preserved better in iron tanks118 rather than 
wooden casks.119 In 1824, the rum ration was halved after tea and cocoa were introduced, and 
meat was issued daily. 120 
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Accounts 
The purser discharged his accountability for stores allocated to his ship by keeping detailed 
accounts of the daily consumption of stores by officers and men aboard.121 The accounting 
requirements became more extensive and specific over time.122 These were outlined in the 
1756 edition of the ‘Private Instructions for the Pursers of Ships’ in the seaman’s Vade 
Mecum123 and in subsequent Regulations and Instructions for Pursers.124 They clearly show 
the need to account for debtor and creditor balances. 
Only two-thirds of the advance payment the purser received to acquire provisions was 
paid in cash. The remainder was a credit allowed to the purser’s accounts. Monies made by 
the purser in his official duties were ‘paper credits’ for which he was reimbursed once his 
accounts had been passed. These accounts were detailed and complicated. Any shortcoming 
in supporting paperwork delayed approval and payment.125 It was not unusual for the 
expenses to take a long time to be paid.126 
The purser’s instructions seem contradictory. He had a responsibility ‘to satisfy himself 
that all the provisions sent on board be sweet, good and wholesome.’127 Yet, he seemed to be 
discouraged to take this requirement too seriously as ‘provisions sent for the supply of His 
Majesty’s Ships shall not be refused on pretence of being old, and unfit for keeping.’ Any 
goods refused had to be surveyed by the captain before being returned to suppliers.128 
If the purser’s signed receipts for the purchases were deemed correct, and were signed 
off by the captain, the purser’s account was credited with a fixed price set by the Board.129 
The Captain also had to oversee and sign for provisions received by the ship. This was a 
further check on the activities of Pursers.130 Where there was a difference between the cost 
and this fixed price, the purser could make a profit (or a loss). In some years, the market price 
of some items exceeded the sum usually charged to pursers for those items. To discourage 
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pursers from selling the provisions at such times, any purser in debt was obliged to pay the 
market price to the Board.131  
Although a purser did not have to pay for his ship’s provisions, his accounts were 
charged with the value of provisions at prevailing standard rates. The credit to his account 
was calculated by the number of authorised men on board, multiplied by the standard 
ration.132 To be repaid for the provisions consumed on his ship, the purser had to keep a 
detailed victualling account. All men on board were allowed the standard ration. For 
example, on Sundays: one pound of biscuit, one gallon of beer, one pound of pork and half a 
pint of pease.133 Each crew member could agree with the purser to eat part, all, or none of 
their ration, and receive a credit for unconsumed rations. The purser also received a credit 
for any provisions returned unused. However, the amount he received for returns was 
usually less than he was charged on issue.134  
Pursers were permitted to purchase provisions from other sources (usually in foreign 
ports), but only when there was a ‘real want.’ In this event, the purser was required to produce 
a certificate from the Governor or Consul (where available) or from two or three eminent 
merchants confirming that the purchases were made at below market prices.135 If the purser 
issued non-standard foods, such as local produce bought in foreign ports, he had to take 
compensation by making savings in the standard rations.136 Such arrangements provided 
opportunities for pursers to profit, mainly by falsifying the cost or quantity purchased.137 With 
increased use of contractor depots and depot ships in the early nineteenth century, the practice 
diminished.   
Provisions stored on board were inspected regularly. Rules on waste were strict. Disposal 
of provisions was a last resort: ‘If the Bread shall be discovered to be damp, [the purser] is to 
apply to the Captain to have it aired on the Quarter Deck or Poop.’138 Losses due to enemy 
action had to be certified: if the Captain  considered any of the provisions unfit for use he was 
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to procure a survey by ‘proper officers, who are to make a regular Report thereon.’139 The 
rules on alcoholic beverages were particularly strict. There was a continual problem with 
leaking casks, necessitating large ships to include coopers in their crew.140 At the end of a 
voyage, a regular survey of provisions remaining was carried out, before the purser’s accounts 
were prepared. The purser then had to swear an affidavit that the said provisions were 
received out of His Majesty’s stores or from persons under contract.141  
The purser’s accounting records were extensive. They were kept in ‘extraordinary 
detail’142 and required numerous certificates and forms, and were considered very important. 
Even if his ship was sinking, the purser was required ‘to use his utmost endeavours to 
preserve all his books, papers and accounts.’143 Although regulations stated explicitly that the 
purser’s diligence in keeping his accounts could affect his career prospects, many still 
submitted late or incomplete records.144 
There were dangers for pursers in diverging from regulations, even under captain’s 
orders. For example, the purser on the Mermaid in 1794, Copland, was ordered by his captain 
to issue extra rum while the ship was in the North Sea. The Board disallowed the expense. 
However, on appeal the claim was deemed reasonable, but the captain’s wages were charged 
instead. Great care needed to be exercised too when making apparently valid claims. Copland 
asked for a copy of the Admiralty Order concerning top and poop lights after disallowance of 
his claim in respect of expenditure on these lights on a voyage of the Alcmene to Lisbon and 
Gibraltar.145 The Captain was required to give written authority for any extra supplies or 
issues146 and for substitutes to be issued (e.g., rice or flour for bread). Such written authorities 
needed to be included in the quarterly survey of provisions by the purser. 
By 1825, within one month of the survey, the purser was required to submit 
comprehensive accounts to the Board (keeping a copy for himself).147 Accounts were 
required quarterly and within 12 months of the last set of accounts lodged during the purser’s 
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term of appointment.148 The accounts were to be accompanied by the following certificate, 
signed by the purser. 
 
I hereby certify that previously to transmitting the Books and Paper herewith sent, I have satisfied myself 
that they are made up and signed by myself, and the respective Officers of the Ship, in exact conformity to 
the Instructions which I have received for my guidance.149  
 
The purser kept two sets of books: one for everyday use, and a fair copy of his victualling 
books. He was required to show both sets of books to the Captain, but not at the same time. 
Both sets of books were not to be out of his possession at any time. The purser was required 
to give the Captain sufficient time to examine the accounts ‘minutely.’150 A certificate from 
the Purser on the monthly book was required to be carefully compared with the victualling 
books (rough and good copies). 
The victualling book was to be certified by both the Purser and the Captain’s Clerk. The 
verifications were from the date of the last monthly muster book and would be examined with 
the ship’s books. The Captain’s Clerk kept a General Muster book which showed the 
complement of men and any changes therein.151  He was required to certify all changes in the 
numbers of seamen (upon which the calculations were based) and these were all examined to 
ensure they agreed with the ships records.152 An additional certificate was required on the 
quarterly accounts of provisions and other goods received.153 The Captain’s Clerk was 
required to keep account of the provisions coming on board, to attend the receiving of those 
provisions, to examine the bill of lading, and to agree to the contents received.154 There was a 
daily account of the men victualled and the provisions issued. As well, a certificate was drawn 
up of provisions issued as substitutes for those unavailable, together with a general account of 
provisions and stores returned, and a yearly statement of account.155 The latter statement was 
posted to the Commissioners for Victualling at the Board where the purser’s calculations were 
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checked. The Statement of Accounts was based on the victualling book and the ‘General 
Account of Provisions Received and Returned’: the debtor side contained the total of each 
type of provision received, after allowance for all credits (e.g. returns, condemned or damaged 
goods). The credit side contained victualling details for each ‘species’, the prescribed 
allowance for waste, any necessary money for the ship’s complement or supernumeraries, and 
any other claims to which the purser was entitled. 
 
The quantities required to be added to the Debtor side of the Account will shew the Surplus of each Article 
to which the Purser is entitled, or his Credit. The quantities that are added to the Credit side will show his 
deficiency or Debt.156 
There were no instructions on the consequences of credit balances. However, instructions 
were more forthcoming about a debit balance. If the purser’s account was in debit, he had to 
provide a ‘the most satisfactory explanation that he can afford, as to the cause of such 
deficiency: and when he might appear to have a credit of any species of provisions exceeding 
his allowance for eighths, he is to send with his statement, a similar explanation as to the 
cause of such extraordinary credit.’157 Depending on the size of the debt and the adequacy of 
its explanation, some amount of this debt could be carried to his next account. Alternatively, 
if there was a large debt without satisfactory explanation, the purser’s guarantors would be 
called upon immediately for payment ‘and he will be considered as undeserving of 
employment in a Ship of a large class.’158 
Slops (sailor’s clothes) were issued in a similar way to victuals. Until 1758, they were 
received from a contractor, thereafter they came from the Navy Board.159 The Purser had to 
keep a Muster book of entry, discharge, desertion, death, attendance and absence of every 
man belonging to the ship and to show against their names the slop clothes and other supplies 
issued to them.160 The General Muster book, the Monthly Slop book and all tickets were 
signed by the Captain, Master, Purser and Boatswain, as was the Sick book.161 
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The Board’s approach to its work was thorough and painstaking. The focus was on 
safeguarding the public purse rather than on achieving efficiency. Underresourcing of the 
Board resulted in a backlog of unexamined accounts − a situation which improved following 
the reconstitution of the Board in 1808.162 Many pursers had to wait for years before their 
accounts were settled, and some were never settled. For example, the Board insisted on 
seeing original documentation before a set of accounts could be passed. However, pursers 
and other officers often considered it too risky to send these on another ship. It was not 
uncommon for duplicate documentation to be unprocessed at the Board until the originals 
could be produced. Similarly, the Board insisted on seeing, and finalising, both sides of a 
transaction before accounts were passed. Many pursers (or their executors) remained unpaid 
because the accounts of agent victuallers had not been finalised.163 By the 1780s, the Board 
was ‘engulfed in almost continuous scandals and divisive rows.’164 Increasingly, it was 
unable to keep up with the accounting requirements of an increased level of business.  
 
Discussion and conclusions  
The period 1665 to 1832 was a time of great economic change that encompassed the 
Industrial Revolution. During this time, the Board was tenacious in regulating the recording, 
controlling, distribution and management of materials, particularly rations. A purser was 
required to keep detailed accounting records, and to have these records approved by his 
ship’s captain, and audited by the Board. Generally, the purser was a wily man who stood to 
gain or lose a great deal of money depending on how he managed provisions − those he 
purchased and those provided to him by the Board. If pursers wanted to cheat sailors of 
provisions, the pursers’ pound was a handy implement with which to do so.  
The records required of pursers suggest that the RN was at the forefront of rudimentary 
attempts to develop cost accounting, and accounting for materials, in the UK prior to the 
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Industrial Revolution. Whether there is reliable empirical support for the positioning of RN 
practice in this way merits closer research. The absence of literature providing an 
authoritative assessment of whether RN settings were the locale for the genesis of standard 
costing and inventory control practices used subsequently in the Industrial Revolution, can be 
attributed to the propensity for accounting historians to ‘look in the wrong place for their 
evidence [because] costing techniques initially emerg[ed] in a less robust form than the 
bound ledgers usually associated with the financial accounting function.’165 The propensity 
for accounting historians to concentrate more on matters of financial accounting than cost 
accounting has led to ‘scant attention’ being accorded to cost accounting history in the UK 
(especially before 1914).166 Such lack of attention has been attributed to ‘the absence of a 
cost accounting literature, a cost accounting curriculum, and an organized profession with 
developed conventions and practices.’167  
This heightens the need to further explore the suggestion that the RN was at the forefront 
of, and provided the genesis for, important accounting practices subsequently adopted by 
entrepreneurs in the Industrial Revolution (many of which are now accepted universally). A 
promising line of enquiry would be to investigate whether early pioneers of cost accounting 
techniques (including standard costing and inventory control) in the Industrial Revolution had 
served in the RN. If so, is there evidence that they implemented or observed those techniques 
in practice before adopting them in their businesses?168 
Agency theory helps in better understanding the purser’s role. The purser was the 
‘representative [agent] of the state [represented by the principal, the Victualling Board]’ 
responsible for ensuring ‘economy and control … [and] the smooth operation of each ship’s 
internal economy.’169 The Board’s initial aim (as principal) was to minimise the cost of 
providing materials and to ensure sailors were sufficiently well-nourished to perform their 
designated duties and that standards of discipline were maintained. However, in addition, the 
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Board ‘had the most politically sensitive task of all government offices, for it had to intervene 
in the markets to procure very large amounts of food.’170  
The Board was in a position of information asymmetry. It could not know, in a timely 
manner, what took place on ships in geographically remote locations. A ship-board purser (as 
agent) would have been aware of this asymmetry. He had ample scope to not follow 
regulations (e.g. to maximise his own income, at the expense of the Board or of seamen 
aboard his ship). Therefore, the Board had to consider the extent to which it was willing to 
expend resources to alter a purser’s opportunities to capture non-pecuniary benefits. The 
‘purser’s measure’ was cost-neutral as far as the Board was concerned: it was equivalent to 
the waste allowance it permitted pursers to sustain in carrying out their role. The purser’s 
measure had the advantage of informally providing a legitimated source of remuneration to 
pursers. Thereby, it enabled their official salaries to be kept at a depressed level, presenting 
economies to the Board. The purser’s measure was, in effect, an institutionalised device to 
allow for waste and to benefit the purser (in terms of physically undistributed provisions). 
In the language of standard costing, the purser’s measure allowed for an institutionalised 
favourable direct materials usage variance171 attributable to the purser. It was an incentive to 
induce the purser (as agent) to act in accord with the desires of the Board (as principal). The 
purser could only realise this incentive if he stored the allocated rations in good order, issued 
them according to standard allowances, and accounted for them diligently.  
The performance of a purser in his interactions with the Admiralty, via the Board (e.g., 
the extent to which he conformed with regulations) helped to determine whether he was re-
employed or promoted to a larger ship. This was significant, since the salary of pursers was 
determined by the size of a ship. There were also opportunities to earn higher allowances and 
commissions on larger vessels. However, adverse selection was also a problem because often 
principals were unable to evaluate the skills of prospective agents.172 This problem was 
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addressed partly when the first pursers with long experience of victualling arrangements were 
appointed to the Board during the Napoleonic Wars.173 This introduction of ‘hands on’ 
expertise is likely to have reduced agency costs and to have enabled the Board to better meet 
the considerable challenges it faced. 
The agent-principal relationship between pursers and the Board needs to be considered 
within a broader dynamic social context ─ one affected by other agency relationships, 
changing regulations, changing objectives, competition, interest groups, experience, and 
social norms.174 Attitudes towards government shifted during the 1780s, establishing the 
principle that private incomes and public revenues should be separated, and that fees and 
gratuities should cease.175 The Spithead and Nore mutinies of 1797 fundamentally changed 
the context within which the Board dealt with pursers. It brought existing practices for supply 
of ships under public scrutiny. Between 1761176 and 1825177 attempts were made to increase 
the programmability of the purser’s task, so that precise desired behaviours were defined178 ─ 
particularly with respect to more prescriptive and extensive accounting requirements. A 
purser’s agreement therefore contained additional bonding covenants, to reduce opportunistic 
behaviour and control potential conflict. Over time, the Board accepted the need to shift 
pursers’ compensation away from contracts which rewarded them for their achievements 
(such as provisioning ships efficiently) and entrepreneurial acumen. The Board moved 
towards agreements which rewarded pursers for adopting appropriate desired behaviours. 
This required the Board to incur additional (agency) costs (paying higher salaries to pursers 
and incurring additional monitoring costs) in the interests of ameliorating public concerns. 
These changes reduced a purser’s freedom of action. Increasingly, his role resembled that of a 
subordinate official rather than an agent. The move from a system using fees, gratuities and 
perquisites to one based on established salaries, mirrored changes that took place in the Board 
itself from 1800.179 
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Future research could consider applying historical institutionalism180 to explore how the 
role of pursers, and the control mechanisms they used, evolved over time. This could be 
carried out using the Spithead and Nore mutinies as a ‘critical juncture’ to analyse changes in 
underlying institutional logic, before and after, the mutinies. There is also scope for further 
use of agency theory to better understand the audit procedures to which pursers were subject. 
Additionally, further research could compare control mechanisms in the RN with those 
adopted by other great navies of the world (Portuguese, Spanish, French, Dutch) prior to, or 
during, the analysis period. Was mimetic isomorphism influential (and if so how) in 
constructing the principal-agent relationship which emerged in the RN?   
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3 Carr Laughton, ‘The Naval Repository’, 148, citing an Anonymous Officer of the Navy.  
 
4 With the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, victualling was facilitated through private contract. One person, 
Denis Gauden, was responsible for supplying all of His Majesty’s Ships. During times of war this proved an 
onerous a task, especially as the government were slow payers, and there were problems with food shortages on 
many ships. Pepys was given the responsibility for devising a new victualling system in 1665. He proposed that 
a new post of surveyor-general be created (supported by a surveyor of victuals in each port) to ensure that 
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